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In this edition of
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the authors
present part 2 of their argument regarding
consumer-based use tax enforcement by
addressing issues such as the psychology
around taxpayer compliance and taxpayer
privacy concerns.
This article is the second in a series arguing
for a modified approach to the state use tax —
one in which states focus greater compliance
efforts on consumers and their individual use
tax obligations. Our prior article addressed the
economic and rule-of-law considerations that

support that approach.1 That article showed (1)
that states will leave a significant amount of tax
revenue uncollected if they focus their
enforcement efforts primarily on vendors, and
(2) that states’ current enforcement postures
threaten to undermine the reciprocal
relationship between the governing and the
governed that is the basis for our system of
laws. This article continues the latter theme and
focuses on that reciprocal relationship from a
compliance angle.
Tax compliance is a function of many factors
— from existing penalties and enforcement
mechanisms to subjective feelings of fairness
and internalized norms of conduct. The state
use tax is not immune from those factors, nor
are the effects of the use tax system confined to
use tax compliance. This article explores those
effects by discussing existing research on tax
compliance and evaluating how inadequate
enforcement of use taxes against consumers can
undermine well-recognized motivators of tax
compliance.
We will also explain in this article why the
move by some states to adopt use tax notice and
reporting statutes is strengthening the case for
greater consumer-based use tax enforcement
efforts. Those statutes offer state governments
new tools for improving consumer-based use
tax compliance. It is crucial for the state
governments that adopt those statutes to use
those tools. Failure to do so could undermine
the rule of law, generate adverse economic and
distributional effects, and threaten general tax
morale and tax compliance.

1

Adam Thimmesch, David Gamage, and Darien Shanske, “The
Case for Consumer-Based Use Tax Enforcement,” State Tax Notes,
Sept. 11, 2017, p. 1049.
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Enforcement, Psychology, and Tax Compliance
States’ current focus on getting vendors to
collect their use taxes is sensible as an
administrative matter, but generates the
economic and rule-of-law problems discussed
in our prior article. Moreover, as we will explain
in this article, inadequate consumer-based
enforcement has the potential to erode
taxpayers’ motivations to comply with their tax
obligations more generally. The relationship
between use tax nonenforcement and tax
compliance is complicated, but both academic
research and real-world evidence suggest that
an important link exists.
To begin the analysis, it is well established
that many factors go into individuals’ decisions
2
of whether to comply with the law. A familiar
model of compliance is the cost-benefit (or
deterrence) model under which taxpayers
weigh the benefits of evading tax against the
costs of evading. That requires an assessment of
the likelihood that evasion would be caught and
the penalties that would be imposed if it were.
That model predicts that taxpayers will choose
to comply if the expected value of
noncompliance is negative after making that
calculation. Conversely, taxpayers will choose
noncompliance if that expected value is
positive.3
The deterrence model provides substantial
insight into why people comply with tax laws,
but most scholars agree that the deterrence
model does not tell the entire story. Scholars
have generally concluded that compliance is
also a function of factors that may not show up
in a traditional cost-benefit analysis, at least to

some extent. Those factors include
psychological influences, including one’s view
4
of the legitimacy of the government’s authority.
Determining the Legitimacy of the
Government’s Authority
Many factors appear to impact individuals’
determinations regarding the legitimacy of the
government’s authority. One such factor is the
perceived trustworthiness of the government
making the particular command. In assessing
that, people may consider whether the
government acts with the right motivations and
whether government officials perform their
5
duties competently. People may also consider
whether the government enforces the law against
6
those who do not comply. Coercion of that sort is
important because it signals competency and
protects complying taxpayers from feeling like
7
“suckers” while others free ride.
Another factor that appears to impact
individuals’ legitimacy determinations is the
fairness of the processes used by the government,
or at least the individuals’ perception of that
fairness.8 The concept of procedural justice
recognizes that people want to be treated
neutrally, honestly, consistently, politely, and
respectfully.9 Research suggests that perceptions
of fairness in government processes are even

4

See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law at 25–27
(Princeton University Press 2006); Margaret Levi et al.,
“Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs,” 53
Am. Behav. Scientist 354, 354–56 (2009) (hereinafter Levi,
Conceptualizing Legitimacy). See generally Levi et al., “The Reasons
for Compliance with the Law,” in Understanding Social Action,
Promoting Human Rights ch. 4 (2012) (hereinafter Levi, Reasons for
Compliance). We alluded to this issue in our earlier article when
we discussed how states’ current postures regarding use tax
enforcement are inconsistent with general rule-of-law
considerations and the reciprocal relationship that exists between
the government and the governed. Thimmesch, Gamage, and
Shanske, supra note 1, at 1053.
5

Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 356.

6

Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 4, at 73; Levi and
Audrey Sacks, A Comparative Series of National Public Attitude
Surveys on Democracy, Markets, and Civil Society in Africa at 12,
15-16 (Afrobarometer, Working Paper No. 74, 2007), available at
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/working_papers/
AfropaperNo74.pdf.
7
2

The literature on compliance is voluminous. See generally
Thimmesch, “Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: The Use Tax
Experiment,” 2015 Utah L. R. 1083, 1088–1105 (2015).
3

Leandra Lederman, “The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance,” 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1463–1466
(2003).
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Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 4, at 73.

8

Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 356; Paul
Mason, Steven Utke, and Brian M. Williams, “Why Pay Our Fair
Share? How Perceived Influence Over Laws Affects Tax Evasion,”
at 24–25; and Tyler, supra note 4, at 175.
9

Id.
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more important than their outcomes when it
comes to predicting future compliance.10 For
example, having a procedurally fair audit may be
more important to a taxpayer than winning that
audit, at least when it comes to deciding whether
11
to report accurately in the future. Americans
might dislike paying tax, but they seem to really
dislike feeling that they have been treated unfairly
by the government.
The Use Tax and the Legitimacy of
State Government
The research discussed above suggests that
many states’ current approaches to use tax
enforcement are problematic. As we discussed in
our prior article, states instruct residents to pay
their use taxes and threaten sanctions for
noncompliance. But many states then take only
limited actions to follow through and actually
enforce the tax against individual consumers.
That incongruity not only creates rule-of-law
issues, but could also be perceived as the
government being dishonest or incompetent.
Neither is good, and neither promotes trust in
government. The limited enforcement of use taxes
also results in a procedurally unjust
administration of the tax laws. It results in the use
tax functioning as an effective tax on honesty that
treats the honest as suckers.12 That is the result of
administrative choice, not legislative judgment,
and it can have a negative impact on voluntary
compliance for the reasons noted above.13
Inadequately enforcing use taxes against
individual consumers could also create unfair
distributional results. To begin to understand
why, consider that many taxpayers appear to be
unaware of the use tax or erroneously have come
to believe that major categories of purchases —
such as all e-commerce purchases — are tax
exempt. Those taxpayers then evade the use tax

unknowingly. Because state governments take
limited enforcement actions against individuals,
most of those taxpayers never learn that they have
inadvertently been committing tax evasion.
By contrast, another group of taxpayers comes
to learn about the use tax, perhaps from their tax
return preparers or because they have tax-aware
social networks. From those same sources, those
taxpayers may also learn about the limited
enforcement of the use tax. Some of those
taxpayers will then choose to comply with their
use tax obligations, potentially making them feel
like suckers while also generating unfair
distributional results for them. Other taxpayers
may decide to commit tax evasion, based on the
low probability of that tax evasion being
detected.
Yet another group of taxpayers may learn
about the use tax — perhaps from the instructions
on state tax returns or from other government
sources — but without learning about its limited
enforcement. Remember that states’ guidance
suggests that reporting use tax is every bit as
important as reporting wage income, so a
taxpayer looking for guidance from the state will
be uninformed about the limited enforcement of
14
the use tax.
As another example of how a taxpayer might
come to learn about the use tax, but not about its
limited enforcement, one of us (Thimmesch) has
participated in training for the Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance program in which state
representatives stressed the importance of
informing clients about their use tax obligations
and asking them about their online purchases.
While that approach is certainly correct as a
matter of law, it has the potential to create adverse
distributional consequences. Absent greater
efforts to increase use tax compliance more
generally, it is problematic to focus compliance
15
efforts on those who are among the least well-off.
State sales and use taxes are already regressive.

10

This work has been extended specifically to tax compliance
with generally positive results. See Thimmesch, supra note 2, at
1099–1101.
11

Eric Kirchler, The Economic Psychology of Tax Behavior at 84-85
(2007).
12

Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 4, at 73.

13

See also Brian T. Camp, “The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of
Taxing Virtual Worlds,” 59 Hastings L.J. 1, 23 (2007) (noting that
voluntary compliance suffers when the government “makes
suckers out of compliant taxpayers by imposing requirements that
are practically unenforceable against noncompliant taxpayers”).

14

Taxpayers can also get this message more actively from the
states. At least one state confronts taxpayers with a pop-up
addressing use tax if they download their tax return from the
state’s website. 2016 Michigan Individual Income Tax Return MI1040, Michigan Department of Treasury (Rev. 06-16).
15

To qualify for assistance, a taxpayer must generally make less
than $54,000, have a disability, or have limited ability to speak
English. See Internal Revenue Service, Free Return Preparation for
Qualifying Taxpayers.
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Encouraging use tax compliance in a manner that
disproportionately affects the least well-off would
unjustly magnify that impact.
Some of those concerns might appear
overblown simply because most consumers seem
16
to be unaware of their use tax obligations. A
consumer unaware of the tax would be hardpressed to react negatively to its nonenforcement.
However, to the extent that is so, it is equally true
that those considerations will become even more
critical for states to consider as they take efforts to
increase consumer awareness of the tax. This
discussion thus suggests that states should
combine efforts to increase consumer knowledge
of the use tax with efforts to better enforce that tax
against those who do not comply. Failing to do so
has the potential to backfire by raising awareness
of a taxing authority that does not have the ability
to enforce the laws on the books.
About Use Tax Notice and Reporting Statutes
At the cutting edge of efforts to increase sales
and use tax compliance are use tax notice and
reporting statutes. Under those statutes, vendors
that do not collect sales and use taxes are required
to instead provide notice and information reports
17
to both consumers and the state. Colorado was
the first to adopt that method, and others have
18
followed suit. The Multistate Tax Commission is
also working on a model statute structured like
the Colorado law.19
That approach generally involves the
imposition of three different requirements on
vendors that do not collect a state’s use tax. First,
those vendors must inform consumers about their
use tax obligations at the point of sale. Second, the
16

Thimmesch, supra note 2, at 1116 n.216.

17

Those requirements are particularly attractive because they
manage to avoid the physical presence requirement of Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota (504 U.S. 298 (1992)). Direct Marketing Association v.
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1146 (2016).
18

See La. Leg., H.B. 1121 (2016 Reg. Sess.); Vt. Gen. Ass., H.B.
873, section 26 (2015-2016 Sess.); Vt. Gen. Ass., H.B. 516, section 23
(2016-2017 Sess.); and Wash. Leg., H.B. 2163, section 205 (2017 2d
Spec. Sess.). For prior work considering the implications of
Colorado’s efforts, see Gamage and Shanske, “The Implications of
CSX and DMA,” State Tax Notes, May 11, 2015, p. 445; Gamage and
Devin Heckman, “A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of ECommerce,” 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483, 523-25 (2012); and Gamage and
Shanske, “The Saga of State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Reflections on the
Colorado Decision,” State Tax Notes, July 16, 2012, p. 197.

vendors must mail their customers an annual
summary of their purchasing activity. Third, the
vendors must provide a summary of that activity
20
to the state.
Those notice and reporting statutes seem to be
focused on promoting individual use tax
compliance and are thus responsive to the
concerns we have raised. As a general matter, we
support state efforts to adopt those statutes,
partially for the reasons we articulate in this series
of articles.
However, raising awareness of the use tax is
only part of the story. As we have emphasized,
increased awareness ought to be tied to increased
enforcement. We are thus concerned about
whether Colorado and the other states
considering use tax notice and reporting
approaches are planning to make use of those
new tools to improve their consumer-focused
enforcement efforts.
Especially worrisome to us is the possibility
that some state governments may be interested in
those tools only as cudgels for encouraging
remote vendors to switch to collecting sales and
use taxes, and that some states therefore might not
intend to use the information provided by those
new statutes to improve consumer-based
enforcement efforts. Such an approach might
seem sensible if one starts from the assumption
that only vendor-based collection of the use tax
matters. Yet, as we have explained in this article
and in our prior article, that perspective is
incorrect. A significant use tax collection gap
would likely remain even with the passage of
something like the Marketplace Fairness Act, and
suppressing the mainsprings of tax compliance
could have untoward effects more broadly.
State governments can at least justify their
limited consumer-based enforcement of use taxes
on the grounds of administrative difficulty. We
argue that those grounds do not justify current
enforcement practices and that state governments
should take further measures to enforce use taxes
against consumers even in the absence of
adopting use tax notice and reporting statutes.
But for the states that adopt notice and reporting
statutes, the excuse of administrative difficulty

19

See Multistate Tax Commission, “Use Tax Information
Working Group.”
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20

Id.
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rings more hollow, as those states will in fact be
receiving much of the information they need to
enforce the tax. In addition, those statutes, by
design, will make the use tax more visible and
thus the lack of enforcement more obvious. Thus,
for those states, continuing to inadequately
enforce use taxes against consumers would more
clearly and dramatically undermine the rule of
law and threaten general tax morale and
compliance.
Moreover, there is an additional challenge
posed by notice and reporting statutes that ought
to be taken into account in considering
compliance: Those statutes potentially create
privacy concerns. The regular collection of
purchasing data is a significant increase in a state
government’s surveillance of taxpayers’ everyday
activities, and states should be aware that this
could have negative effects on compliance as well.
As discussed above, research suggests that
taxpayer compliance is at least partially built on
trust in the government and taxpayers’ beliefs
regarding the legitimacy of the government’s
authority. If taxpayers believe that the reporting
requirements are illegitimate or an unfair
encroachment on their privacy, they could
respond in kind by putting less effort into
complying with their tax obligations.
Of course, different people think about
privacy in different ways. Some think that privacy
is dead, while others argue that privacy is even
more important in today’s world. We cannot settle
those debates here. What we can do here is
suggest that privacy can be understood as a set of
expectations regarding the flow of information in
21
particular contexts. When those norms change —
whether because of the disclosure of information
to a new party, the disclosure of information in a
new way, or a change in how information is
protected — some may feel a loss of privacy.22
Even when those feelings of privacy loss might be
justified by society’s pursuit of other worthy
causes (such as tax enforcement), that does not

change the fact that some will experience the loss
nonetheless.
Use tax notice and reporting statutes would
seem to be strong examples of actions that harm
privacy under that conception, whether they
23
result in any legal privacy violation. An annual
summary of purchasing activities provided to the
state represents a significant change to the norms
of information flow in the context of online
commerce, and it is safe to suggest that at least
some individuals will perceive privacy loss from
such a report. States should thus consider the
potential impact on taxpayers’ views regarding
legitimacy and, correspondingly, on taxpayers’
24
motivations to voluntarily comply.
To be clear, our concerns with notice and
reporting statutes do not indicate that we think
they are a bad idea.25 Instead, our analysis is
meant to demonstrate how a quite sensible
attempt to increase vendor compliance can create
problems for individual compliance. That would
not matter if individual compliance did not
matter, but we have argued that it does. Thus, we
conclude that any state considering the adoption
of notice and reporting statutes should also
consider improved consumer-focused
26
compliance efforts. If states do not make use of
the tools that notice and reporting statutes
provide to improve consumer-focused
compliance efforts, then it becomes much harder
to justify the loss of privacy that will be felt by at
least some individuals, and the resulting harm to
the rule of law and to tax compliance.

23

On balance, and depending on the details of the statute, we
think those statutes can pass muster, but, again, that is not the key
from a compliance perspective. For further discussion, see Scott W.
Gaylord and Andrew J. Haile, “Constitutional Threats in the ECommerce Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce
Clause Limits on Amazon Laws and Use Tax Reporting Statutes,”
89 N.C. L. Rev. 2011 (2011).
24

As we noted in our prior article, that is increasingly important
as taxing authorities attempt to catch up to a changing economy.
See Thimmesch, Gamage, and Shanske, supra note 1, at 1052 (noting
the challenges of the “gig economy” for tax compliance).
25

21

On that point, it would demonstrate a great deal of chutzpah
for remote vendors to complain about notice and reporting statutes
on the two grounds we articulate, as it is those vendors’
unwillingness to collect the use tax, even as it becomes ever easier
and cheaper to do so, that has been the impetus for states to craft
those statutes. As Paul Krugman has explained, “The traditional
definition of chutzpah says it’s when you murder your parents,
then plead for clemency because you’re an orphan,” see “Maestro of
Chutzpah,” The New York Times, Mar. 2, 2004.

22

States should also consider finding ways to assuage privacy
concerns.

Professor Helen Nissenbaum calls that “contextual integrity.”
Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity,” 79 Wash. L. Rev. 119
(2004); see also Dan Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” 90 Calif. L.
Rev. 1087, 1127-28 (2002) (arguing that privacy is best understood in
“specific contextual situations”).
Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context 141-47 (2010).

26
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Conclusion
Through this article and our prior article in
this series, we have built the case for a modified
approach to the state use tax. Our proposed
approach would take consumer compliance more
seriously. To be sure, the task of improving
consumer-based compliance may be difficult. Yet
that task is worth undertaking. Efforts to improve
consumer-based compliance would have
economic benefits, would support the rule of law,
and could promote voluntary compliance more
generally. Overall, that is a project worth the
candle, and our next article in this series will
provide concrete examples of consumer-centric
approaches that states could take that are backed
by academic and field research.
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